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MAC RA: 
EMERGING FROM THE THICKET 
by David M Heller* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1990s, healthcare reform has roiled domestic politics in the United States. 
Issues of insurance coverage, drug pricing, healthcare delivery, and the role of the state 
deeply divided the country's political parties and living rooms. However, one area of 
reform maintains broad bipartisan consensus: physician reimbursement reform. 
Healthcare expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") continue 
to rise at unsustainable levels, 1 leading to serious questions about the sustainability 
of the Medicare Trust Fund. The Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement system 
currently operates predominantly through a Fee-For-Service ("FFS") structure, where 
the government reimburses providers for each individual procedure. FFS is perceived 
as a major contributor to the exponential increase in healthcare expenditures over 
recent decades.2 
In 2015, Congress sought to reign m FFS expenditures and improve physician 
reimbursement by passing the Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 
("MACRA"). MACRA leverages multiple policy initiatives and incentivizes providers 
through a payment structure that is commonly referred to as "value-based care." Value-
based care rewards positive clinical outcomes rather than providing payment based 
on volume. However, as exhibited by similar programs in the past, uneven regulatory 
implementation threatens to foil MACRA's efficacy. 
* David Heller is Corporate Counsel at Greenway Health, a leading provider of health information 
technology to ambulatory healthcare practices. He is also a member of the Executive Committee 
of the Electronic Health Records Association (EHRA.). The opinions expressed in this Article are 
solely those of 11r. Heller, and do not reflect the views of Greenway Health, the EHRA, or any other 
entity or individual. The author would like to thank Debbie J. Alfstad, the practice administrator 
of the Retina Institute of Texas, PA. for her contribution to this article with respect to health 
information exchange and emergency-based specialists. See infra note 69. 
1 The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) estimates that healthcare expenditures 
will account for nearly 20% of GDP by 2020. Spending growth is set to outpace GDP growth 
by 1.2% each year. Center For Medicaid and Medicare Services, 2016-2025 Projections of 
National Health Expenditures Data Released (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroorn/ 
MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2017-Press-releases-items/2017-02-15-2 .html. 
2 Writing for the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Steven Schroeder and Dr. William Frist, 
who served on the National Commission on Physician Payment Reform, noted that "[c]ontrolling 
rising expenditures for health care will not occur without changing the way that physicians are 
paid." They further elaborated stating that "fixing current payment inequities under fee-for-service 
models will be of the utmost importance." Steven Schroeder & William Frist, Phasing Out Fee-for-
Service Payment, 368 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2029, 2030 (2013), http://¥.'WW.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/ 
NEJMsb 1302322. 
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This article explores MACRA's policy roots and history, analyzes how its current 
regulatory implementation echoes past reform efforts, and sets forth recommendations 
for easing the program's regulatory burden on providers while preserving Congress's 
intended implementation of the legislation. It reasons that failure of the Sustainable 
Growth Rate and other programs designed to control healthcare spending led to 
MACRA's passage in 2015, and argues that MACRA's regulatory implementation 
suffers from many of the same defects as its predecessors (namely inconsistent 
implementation and umealistic expectations of the healthcare delivery and health 
IT markets). Absent a change from CMS, implementation defects threaten the long-
term viability of the statute and undermines its policy goals of improving quality and 
controlling spending. 
II. MACRA'S AND DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM'S HISTORY 
A. The Sustainable Growth Rate Becomes Unsustainable 
MACRA's history is rooted in a series of budget debates that took place in the 1990s. The 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 sought to balance the federal budget by cutting Medicare 
expenditures. To do so, the Act implemented the Medicare Sustainable Growth Rate 
("SGR"). Designed to hold the growth of Medicare Part B expenditures in line with 
GDP growth, SGR calculations were based on four factors: 
1. Estimated percentage changes in fees for physicians' services; 
2. Estimated percentage changes in the number of Medicare beneficiaries; 
3. Estimated change in GDP per capita; and, 
4. Estimated percentage change in expenditures due to changes in law 
or regulations. 3 
As the economy grew through the late nineties, doctors experienced moderate increases 
in their FFS rates. However, when the economy slowed in 2000 and later years, these 
increases turned into rate cuts under the SGR. Congress intervened by replacing 
cuts to providers' FFS rates with small increases to physician payments. Following 
Congressional intervention, the gap between the statute's target expenditures and 
actual expenditures continued to grow.4 Between 2003 and 2014, Congress passed 
16 laws overriding the SGR's cuts due to annual physician outcry5 and the sudden 
3 Balanced of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 4502-4503, 111Stat251, 432-434 (1997). 
4 Conor Ryan, a statistician and data 
math that led to the S.G.R.'s uu,u,,a.rnau1rny, 
and 
than 
vA<11111J1<0, in a letter directed at Dave Camp and other members of the House of 
Ke1ore:sentatJves the American Medical Association (AMA) sharply criticized members of the 
House who did not support a bill to the SGR because services 
to GDP would lead to reimbursement rates[.]" The AMA further 
stated "[a]s nrerncreo. the SGR did result in a 4.8% cut in 2002. Congress declined and that cut went 
into effect. ln years, Congress did step in to prevent additional cuts from The 
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negative adjustment on physician reimbursement rates. 6 As Congress continued to 
delay Medicare spending cuts, lawmakers delivered a series of reforms designed to 
reward doctors for controlling utilization while maintaining or improving the quality 
of care. This series ofreforms measures clinicians from three aspects: (1) quality, (2) 
the utilization or cost of patient care, and (3) process and technology. Lawmakers 
incorporated these elements in three main programs: the Physician Quality Reporting 
System ("PQRS"), the Value-based Modifier ("VBM"), and the Electronic Health 
Record Incentive Program, commonly called "Meaningful Use." Each of these 
programs adjusted physicians' reimbursement on Medicare claims based on their 
performance on the programs' respective measures. 
B. Quality Reporting Becomes Undermined by Complexity 
In 2006, Congress authorized Medicare incentives for quality reporting through 
the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 20067 and CMS implemented the statute by 
creating the PQRS. The program underwent a series of statutory changes over time. 
The Medicare, Medicaid, & SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 solidified the PQRS with 
a permanent place in the reimbursement structure. 8 In 2010, the Affordable Care Act 
("ACA") added another layer to PQRS by introducing penalties. Physicians who failed 
to report quality data to CMS were penalized, and penalties continued to escalate on a 
yearly basis. In tandem, the ACA ended PQRS incentives, converting the system into 
a pure penalty program. 9 
From a regulatory perspective, PQRS was complex. At its height, it required reporting 
on nine separate clinical quality measures. 10 Physicians had to choose a measure 
that was "cross-cutting," or broadly applicable to most specialties. There were also 
guidelines on selecting "high priority measures," which specifically focused on quality 
measures that had certain domain designations, such as "population management."11 
At its start, the program offered 7 4 total quality measures, a figure that eventually 
increased to 281 total measures by the program's end. Further complicating matters, 
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, the Medicare, Medicaid, 
and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007, and the Medicare Improvement for Patients Act of 2008 each 
temporary relief for seniors and their from cuts. Letter from the ANIA 
to Dave Camp, House of Representatives 
6 Jim Hahn out these laws which includes several vv<Hu.m.u<is 
The Sustainable Growth Rate (S G.R) and Medicare t'm1wrlfm 
7 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat 2922, 2975-2981 
(1997). 
8 Medicare, Medicaid, & SCRIP Extension Act of2007, Pub. L No. 110-173, § 101, 121 Stat 
2492, 2494 (2007). 
9 Affordable Care Act, Pub. L No. 111-148, § 3002, 124 Stat 119, 363 (2010). 
10 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Reporting 
Sheet, 2 (2016). 
11 Id. 
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physicians could report on quality measures using different submission mechanisms. 12 
Initially, clinicians could report only on their Medicare claims using codes such as 
Quality Data Codes ("QDCs") or G-Codes, and the claim code would have to tie 
back to the appropriate diagnosis code or procedure code. Depending on the patient's 
treatment plan, some measures involved a host of applicable CPT codes, G-codes, or 
QDCs at the same time. 13 
Later, CMS drastically expanded the available reporting mechanisms in response to 
the industry's health information technology ("health IT") implementation. Eventually, 
clinicians could opt to report measures via electronic health record ("EHR") or clinical 
data registries. However, providers were unable to report each measure via all of the 
available submission mechanisms. For example, one measure might be reportable only 
through a registry, and another measure might only be reportable through an EHR. 14 The 
number of measures available for each mechanism also varied. When CMS introduced 
EHR-based reporting, there were only ten measures available for that mechanism. The 
number of measures available for EHR-based reporting eventually expanded to 64 out 
of 281 total measures. 15 If a provider desired to report on a different measure excluded 
from the EHR-based reporting mechanism, they were required to select a claims-based 
measure or purchase a registry connection in addition to the EHR. This could quickly 
become a rather expensive and complex proposition depending on how a provider 
wanted to participate. 
12 Each year CMS published, and still does pursuant to MACRA, a list of quality measures 
available for physicians to select. For example, for the 2016 performance period, the Physician 
Fee Schedule listed measures available for Claims, registry, or EHR reporting. Medicare Program: 
Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B for 
CY 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 70,886, 71,216 (Nov. l 6, 2015). 
13 CMS maintains a comprehensive list of Quality Measure Specifications and their supporting 
documents. For a full listing of measure specifications used today, visit https://W1;vw.cms.gov/ 
Medicare/Quality-Payment-Program/Resource-Library/2018-Resources.html. 
14 Physicians "choose" their quality measures through the Quality Payment Program's website 
at https:// qpp .cms.gov/mips/ explore-measures/ quality-measures?py=2018#measures. There, 
a physician or practice manager generally filters by specialty to see what quality measures are 
supported for their specific practice that year. Many fail to take the second step and filter by 
submission mechanism. A mental health practitioner may filter by specialty and find that his or her 
practice can choose both the Adult Major Depressive Disorder (MDD): Suicide Risk Assessment 
measure or Adherence to Antipsychotic Medications for Individuals with Schizophrenia. However, 
the former can only be reported through an EHR, and the latter can only be reported through a 
registry. Whether a physician can use both measures depends on what technologies they have 
purchased or licensed. This can be counterintuitive because the technology used to send measure 
data to CMS is not clinically relevant, nor is it readily apparent why a clinical quality measure could 
only be reported in one way. 
15 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015 Reporting Experience Including Trends (2007-
2015), 3 (2017). 
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The effect of this complexity is evident in the number of clinicians who successfully 
submitted data. Initially, only 15% of physicians participated voluntarily. 16 2015 
marked the height of the PQRS program; participation was mandatory at that time. 17 
Even then, over 30% of physicians took a penalty to their Medicare revenue instead 
of participating in the reporting program. 18 For providers who chose to participate, 
success varied based on the method of reporting. Physicians who reported using the 
EHR successfully submitted nine measures more frequently than those reporting via 
another mechanism. 19 Varying success rates between mechanisms was potentially 
attributed to a provider's use of a single set of technology or employ of only one 
system's workflows. 20 For example, most providers chose to have an EHR installed. 
Those providers then used the EHR to capture data and used a registry to report the 
captured data. This process required, at a minimum, multiple logins and portals. In 
the most extreme circumstances, providers were required to conduct a manual chart 
review to ensure that the data passing between the EHR and the registry was accurate. 
Even those using EHR-based reporting experienced setbacks because the number of 
EHR-based quality measures was severely limited compared to registry measures. 
In 2017, Medicare's quality reporting only supported 53 EHR-based measures even 
though there were 216 registry measures available. Overall, low participation rates 
over the course of the program's lifespan were likely a result of the difficulties that 
clinicians faced when completing the reporting process. 
C. Health Information Technology and EHRs Suffer from Complex Measurement 
Congress's incentive program eventually morphed into a penalty program, producing 
EHRs. In 2009, as part of the American Recovery and Investment Act, Congress enacted 
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act ("HITECH 
Act"). When the law was passed, most patient records were recorded and stored on 
paper.21 Physicians appeared particularly resistant to adopting new technology, 
16 Id. at xiv. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at xiii. 
19 96% reporting their EHR reported on 9 or more measures, 
fulfilling the program's requirement. Qualified Clinical Data Registries come in at a close second, 
with 86% of their users on 9 or more measures. From there, it's a steep drop to 39% via 
~~,"-"~"J speaking, the manual effort involved in reconciling data increases with the number of 
platforms used to communicate the same basic set of data. The technology platforms may read the 
data in different ways, or record it using different vocabularies. To illustrate the problem properly, 
imagine trying to transfer contact lists from one Apple phone to another. It is simple because both 
phones use the same architecture. However, when migrating the same contact list from an Apple 
phone to a Google phone, the transfer may result in duplicates, or contacts splitting into discrete 
entries. Now imagine leaping from Apple, to Google, to Microsoft. Then the list is exported from 
Microsoft to an Excel file. The fields are bound to be messy without manual manipulation of 
the data at each transfer. Doctors face the same challenge. However, health information, namely 
treatment, diagnosis, and payment data, is far more complex than the name, email, and phone 
number fmmat of a basic contacts list 
21 In 2009, only 48.3% of office-based had any EHR installed. A basic EHR, which 
computerized demographics, 
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particularly because no standardized electronic health record existed. In contrast, 
Congress aimed to create a modem health IT infrastructure capable of delivering more 
efficient, transparent, and timely care. 
The HITECH Act created the "Meaningful Use" program as an incentive for providers 
to acquire EHRs. 22 These incentives were calculated as a percentage increase in a 
provider's Medicare or Medicaid revenue. 23 As applied to Medicaid, the program 
was a pure incentive program.24 CMS was responsible for overseeing the program 
and defining the guidelines for how to measure Meaningful Use. Over the following 
years, the Medicare Part B side of Meaningful Use morphed into a penalty program. 
Physicians who did not "meaningfully use" technology lost a percentage of their 
Medicare Part B revenue.25 In application, the Meaningful Use program became 
mandatory. 
Meaningful Use was originally intended to take effect in incremental stages. 26 CMS 
implemented the system as a pass/fail program with measure thresholds. A provider's 
failure on one measure (out of roughly 8-10 total measures) caused the provider to fail 
entirely. However, the regulatory implementation of Meaningful Use was inadequate, 
and continued to decline when the program's penalties took effect. Manifold problems 
added to the program's demise. For example, the patient engagement requirements 
lacked reasonable thresholds.27 Further, CMS frequently delayed changing 
requirements, failing to recognize that the original deadlines for participation or 
thresholds were patently too aggressive in the first place. 28 This scenario continued 
for medications, and viewing lab results, was only present in 21.8% of physician offices. Office-
based Physician Electronic Health Record Adoption, HEALTH lT DASHBOARD, https://dashboard. 
healthitgov/quickstats/pages/physician-ehr-adoption-trends.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2018). 
22 HITECH Act, Pub. L No. 111-5, § 4101, 123 Stat 115, 467-468 (2009). 
23 Id. 
24 Id 
25 Id. at§ 472. 
26 Specifically, the HITECH act states that "[t]he Secretary shall seek to improve the use of 
electronic health records and health care quality over time by requiring more stringent measures of 
meaningful use[.]" Id. at § 470. 
27 Meaningful Use Stage 2 originally required that 5% of all unique patients seen by an EP view, 
dovvnload, or transmit their health record (VDT). Many providers expressed frustration with this 
measure because it penalized providers for actions not always reasonably \Vithin their control. The 
measure was later reduced to just one patient in response to the outcry. Medicare and Medicaid 
Programs: Electronic Health Record Incentive Program - Stage 3 and Modifications to Meaningful 
Use in 2015 Through 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 62762, 62789 (Oct 16, 2015). 
28 In another example, CMS later released "Modified Stage 2," which required providers 
to connect to a public health agency, clinical data registry, or specialty registry. This caused 
industry-wide panic, as many providers did not plan to attest this way because it was not 
initially required. CMS later pulled back this requirement, stating that if a provider had not 
planned to attest to this requirement, they were excluded from the measure. This was done 
through a fact sheet rather than formal rulemaking. EHR Incentive Programs in 2015: Alternate 
Exclusions & CENTER FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES (2015), https://www. 
cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRincentive Program s/Downloads/2015 _ 
AlternateExclusionsandSpecifications.pdf 
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to play out through "Modified Stage 2." Stage 2 contained aggressive timelines that 
were poorly received by physicians. To accommodate providers, CMS dramatically 
changed the measure specifications and exclusions for years 2015-2017 through the 
Modified Stage 2 regulation. However, these accommodations were undermined by 
their delayed adoption because CMS took action in October of2015, about 10 months 
into the 2015 performance period. 29 Finally, CMS consistently introduced incremental 
flexibility through a series of exclusions from measures or objectives.30 This flexibility 
supplemented the complex nature of the program by adding exclusions and different 
paths for disqualification from certain measures into an already complicated 
measurement scheme. 
In aggregate, these shortcomings had notable effects on the market. Physicians across 
the country developed a distaste for EHRs.31 Providers expressed frustration and 
confusion with Meaningful Use's seemingly ever-changing requirements. Many did not 
see a practical purpose in their EHR and wished to return to the era of paper charts.32 
Retirements spiked.33 In the eyes of many clinicians, the program rendered the word 
"meaningful" meaningless. 
D. The Value-Based Modifier and the Cost of Patient Care 
Congress established the Value-based Modifier ("VBM") through the Affordable Care 
Act in 2010, one year after the passage of the HITECH Act. VBM represents Congress's 
attempt to reward clinicians for controlling the cost of patient care while maintaining 
quality. Similar to PQRS and Meaningful Use, the VBM plan furnished provider 
payments two years after the applicable performance period.34 CMS introduced VBM 
29 80 Fed. Reg. 62762, 62787 (Oct. 16, 2015). 
30 The exclusions governing public health reporting are a good example of the complexity involved 
in a single measure. The "general exclusions" of that measure provided that the measure did 
not apply if 1) there was no registry in their jurisdiction ready to accept data, 2) if there was no 
registry at all. Then there was a set of three specific exclusions that applied to the three sub-types of 
registries, immunization registries, syndromic surveillance registries, and specialty registries. On top 
of the complexity within this one measure, each other measure out of the 10 objectives in 2016 all 
had 2-3 specific exclusions. 80 Fed. Reg. 62762, 62820 (Oct. 16, 2015). 
31 According to a 2017 survey by Medical Economics, 63% of users had a negative opinion of 
their EHR. 2017 EHR Report Card, MEDICAL EcoNOMICS (Oct. 25, 2017), http://medicaleconomics. 
modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/2017-ehr-report-card. 
32 The former president of the AJV[A noted that "[t]he message from physicians is loud and clear: 
Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems have so much potential, but frustrating government 
regulations have made them almost unusable." Steven J. Stack, we EHR 
meaningful use isn t AMA WIRE (July 21, 2015), https://wire.ama-assn.org/ama-news/ 
physicians-we-hear-you-ehr-meaningful-use-isnt-meaningful. 
33 While there is a question of causality, the ONC noted that 41 % of providers who did not adopt 
or plan to adopt an EHR cited retirement as their main reason. Office of the National Coordinator 
for Health IT, Physician Health Records (Dec. 2014) https:// 
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/oncdatabrief-physician-ehr-adoption-motivators-2014.pdf. 
34 Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3007, 124 Stat. 119, 373 (2010). 
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by phasing the program in over the course of three years and applying it to physician 
organizations of varying sizes depending on the performance period.35 
The program included a complex measurement process that leveraged an array of 
data, including quality data received from the PQRS program, composite measures of 
hospital admissions for acute and chronic conditions sensitive to ambulatory care, and 
a measure of 30-day all-cause hospital readmissions.36 Finally, to calculate cost, the 
program implemented CMS claims data to calculate six separate measures, including: 
(1) total per capita costs for all beneficiaries measure and total per capita costs for 
beneficiaries with specific conditions, (2) diabetes, (3) coronary artery disease, ( 4) 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, (5) heart failure; and (6) Medicare spending per 
beneficiary measure.37 
Because CMS calculated the VBM score through claims data aggregated after the 
close of the performance period, physicians were largely unable to predict how their 
cashflow would be impacted in later years because they could not fully assess their 
performance in the present. Between 2011 and 2015, the administrative and reporting 
burden ballooned. With the VBM, PQRS, and Meaningful Use combined, ambulatory 
physicians were subject to no fewer than 25 measures that had different reporting 
requirements, workflows, reporting deadlines, and portals. 
III. 2015: MACRA USHERS IN A NEW ERA 
2015 saw the dawn of a new era in healthcare reform through a rare act of bipartisanship. 
SGR once again came into play as the politically toxic nature of the program motivated 
Congress to change or repeal the law. At the same time, representatives received 
numerous complaints from physician associations and technology vendors stating that 
the various reporting programs were too complex and burdensome.38 While Congress 
desired to replace the SGR, it also wanted to leave in place a simplified regime that 
could control costs to stabilize healthcare expenditures. Congress addressed these 
concerns in the Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015. 39 The measure passed 
overwhelmingly. 92 Senators and 392 Representatives from the House voted in favor of 
theAct.40 
35 Medicare Program: Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Fee Schedule and Other 
Revisions to Part B for CY 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 70,886, 71,384 (Nov. 16, 2015). 
36 ld. 
37 Id. at 71,279. 
38 The AMA submitted a detailed letter to CMS in October 2014 that a 
cm:11pr,ehensi·ve view concerns prior to MACRA's passage. While focused on 
Use, it calls out other programs such as PQRS. As a whole, the letter attacks ,,.~urn""'' 
Use's measure thresholds, lack with other programs, lack 
crn:11pl<ex11y See Letter from the AMA to R Tavenner, et al., Administrator For the Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (Oct 14, 2014). 
39 MACRA, Pub. L No. 114-10, 129 Stat 87 (2015). 
40 All Actions HR 2 - 114th Congress (2015-2016) 
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In addition to repealing the SGR, MACRA created the Merit-based Incentive 
Payment System ("MIPS").41 MIPS rolled PQRS, Meaningful Use, and the Value-
based Modifier into a single reporting program. Under MACRA, each category 
was respectively labelled quality, meaningful use of certified EHR technology, 
and resource use.42 Congress also added a new element called Clinical Practice 
Improvement Activities, which gave physicians credit for making clinical process 
changes.43 Under MACRA, Medicare reporting would have one deadline and a single 
reporting portal. It would also be regulated through a single regulatory stream. All 
in all, MACRA aimed to simplify the process of reporting quality data to Medicare. 
In addition to easing the reporting process, the program authorized CMS to give 
providers significant flexibility in the first two years of the program. 44 Most notably, 
Congress gave CMS flexibility to set the composite score lower than the mean or 
median of prior performance scores.45 
However, consolidation of the various programs came with senous financial 
consequences. Over time, MIPS is set to become more financially aggressive. In 2017, 
physicians faced incentives or penalties of 4% of their Medicare revenue.46 After full 
implementation occurs, physicians will face incentives or penalties of up to 9% of their 
Medicare revenue.47 For organizations whose payer mix consists of predominantly 
Medicare beneficiaries, the incentives or penalties could represent the organization's 
entire profit margin. 9% also presents a three percent increase in the net total financial 
downside presented by PQRS, Meaningful Use, and the Value-Based Modifier. The 
program is budget neutral48 (i.e. for every incentive dollar earned, another physician 
receives a one-dollar penalty). Additionally, providers will be measured against the 
mean or median of the market's overall performance.49 
Congress designed MIPS as a budget neutral program to create a business case 
for participation in an Advanced Alternative Payment Model ("APM"). Under an 
Advanced APM, a provider shares the financial risk of the cost of patient care with 
CMS. If the provider is capable of lowering the cost of care while maintaining quality, 
CMS rewards the provider with a financial incentive. Alternatively, if the provider 
fails to lower the cost, or does so by decreasing the quality of care, CMS punishes 
the provider by imposing a financial penalty. The statute defines an Advanced APM 
as a payment model based on the organization's undertaking of "more than nominal 
risk."50 This heightened financial risk usually occurs in the form of shared savings 
or shared losses. In other words, CMS will share the government's savings with 
41 
Id. at 96. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 107. 
45 IVJACR_/\, Pub. L. No. 
46 Id. at 
§ 101, 129 Stat 87, 106 5). 
Id. 
48 MACRA, Pub. L No. 114-10, § 
49 Id. 107. 
SIJ Id. 119. 
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129 87, ] 08 (2015). 
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healthcare providers who decrease CMS 's overall cost of patient care by reducing 
hospitalizations, preventing health catastrophes, and providing proactive care. Instead, 
if a provider costs CMS additional funds, the provider will pay a fraction of that cost 
out to CMS and the broader healthcare system.51 Designed to be a direct replacement 
for the SGR, Congress hoped Advanced APMs and the MIPS penalty structure would 
streamline and improve the reporting process. 
Despite Congress's intention to simplify MAC RA and remove political uncertainty 
from physician payments, providers have expressed hostility towards the program. 
Lamenting about the financial components and the infancy of the program, many 
physician organizations have resisted the program's implementation at each stage of 
adoption. Notwithstanding MACRA's simplification in comparison to prior programs, 
even the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission has now recommended that 
Congress replace MIPS with a simpler or voluntary altemative.52 In response, the 
authors of MAC RA indicated their expectation that CMS fully and faithfully implement 
the statute. 53 Despite widespread pushback, MACRA is bolstered by bipartisan 
buy-in and general dislike of the fee-for-service system. Relying on this supportive 
base, it appears that MACRA is here to stay. As CMS proceeds with MACRA, it is 
increasingly clear that the program's success depends on the details of implementation 
and physician buy-in. However, inconsistent implementation, initial aggressive and 
umealistic programmatic requirements, and late adjustments to those requirements 
threaten the program's future. 
IV. MACRA IN 2017 & 2018: WALKING IT BACK 
A. 2017's Proposed Regulation: Panic in the Market 
On May 9, 2016, CMS released the first in a series of proposed rules implementing 
MIPS and the other provisions of MAC RA. Similar to the implementation of its legacy 
programs, the rule set out aggressive requirements with significant financial impacts 
for the first year. To begin, CMS required one full year of reporting.54 If a physician 
accepted more than $10,000 in Medicare revenue and cared for fewer than 100 Part B 
51 See id. 
52 Kate Bloniarz et al., and Payments: rm;.rn;um 
Health Services; and Moving the ,Merit-based Incentive Payment 
MedPac (Jan. 11, 2018) http://v.rww.medpac.gov/docs/defaul1-source/default-documen1-library/jan-
2018-phys-mips-public.pdf?sfnsn=O. 
53 A bipartisan group with members from multiple committees v,,Tote that "Congress 
overwhelmingly passed the bipartisan Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA). 
We wTite to express the importance of successful implementation, as intended by Congress, of the 
reforms included in MACRA and the establishment of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System 
(MIPS) and Alternate Payment Model (APM) tracks for physician payment." Letter from Congress 
Burwell, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Sept. 6, 2016), 
16-EC.WM-MACRA-Letter. 
54 Medicare Program; Merit-Based Incentive PayTHent System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment 
Model (APM) Incentive under the Fee Schedule, and Criteria for Focused 
Payment Models, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,162, 28,218 (May9, 2016). 
10 
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beneficiaries, they were subject to MIPS payment adjustments.55 CMS summarized the 
program's costs and benefits, estimating $833 million in negative adjustments and $833 
million in positive adjustments over the first year; the adjustments would be spread out 
over a range of 687 ,000 to 746,000 total "eligible clinicians."56 
Generally, the statute commands CMS to set the performance threshold each year based 
on the mean or median of the prior year's score. 57 For the first performance period, CMS 
proposed an alternative threshold determination based on an analysis of Part B allowed 
charges, 2014 and 2015 PQRS data submissions, feedback data on cost and quality, and 
Meaningful Use program data.58 Though the program took effect on January 1, 2017, 
providers did not receive their first year target for the 2017 performance period until 
October-December 2017. 
In addition to obvious obstacles such as time compression, physicians also faced the 
daunting task of understanding and adopting a new and complex MIPS scoring system. 
CMS proposed a calculation of 50% for Quality, 25% for Advancing Care Information 
(ACI) (the new regulatory designation for Meaningful Use), 15% for Clinical Practice 
Improvement Activities, and 10% for Cost. However, each specific category required a 
different number of total points in order for providers to earn full credit. 
Quality scoring required reporting on six measures, including at least one outcomes 
measure.59 Providers had to earn a quality score of 60 points to receive a 100% in that 
category.60 Thus, earning 30 Quality points would supply a provider with 25% of their 
MIPS composite score. CMS measured cost using the familiar Medicare Spending Per 
Beneficiary measure, in conjunction with 14 new episode-based measures.61 
A new scoring category, Clinical Practice Improvement Activities, measured the 
implementation of clinical process improvements called "improvement activities." In 
the proposed rule, each activity was worth a certain number of points. Most practices 
had to achieve 60 points to receive full credit in the Clinical Practice Improvement 
Activities category. Small practices, or those with 15 eligible clinicians or fewer, 
were only required to earn 30 points.62 Under this category, there were "high priority" 
activities worth 20 points (e.g. providing 24/7 access to the care team), and "medium 
priority" activities worth 10 points (e.g. screening patients with certain mental health 
conditions for depression).63 
28,230. 
56 Id. at 28,165. 
57 MACRA, Pub. No. 14-10, § 101, 129 Stat 87, 107 (2015). 
58 Medicare Program; Merit-Based lncentive Payment System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment 
Model (APM) Incentive under the Fee Schedule, and Criteria for Focused 
Payment Models, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,162, 28,274 (May 9, 2016). 
59 at 28,164. 
60 Id. 28,256. 
61 Id. 28, 196. 
62 Id. at 28,266. 
63 Id. 28,267 0 
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Next, the scoring scheme for Advancing Care Information (ACI) (previously referred to 
as Meaningful Use) was, and remains, a tangled web of requirements. It was composed 
of several elements, including a base score, performance score, and bonus score. 64 
Although CMS announced that MIPS eliminated the arbitrary pass/fail elements of the 
legacy programs, the elimination was not fully executed. The base score included a set 
of 4-5 "required" measures, which consisted of a numerator and denominator.65 The 
numerator is the number of times a provider takes a particular action using technology, 
and the denominator represents the number of encounters where that action is 
presumably relevant. Under ACI, the provider had to earn a 1 in the numerator for these 
"base" measures. 66 Providers who did not meet the base measures threshold failed the 
entire category, echoing the pass/fail structure of Meaningful Use. 67 Because of the 
low thresholds, CMS elected not to provide for exclusions in 2017.68 Thus, providers 
who did not write prescriptions, take referrals or receive transitions of care would fail 
the entire category. 69 Providers who passed the base score would receive 50% of the 
ACI score. To reach 100% under ACI (25% of the MIPS composite), providers had 
to rely on performance score or "bonus score."70 The performance measures, which 
sometimes overlapped with the base measures, were best explained as "the more you 
do, the more you earn."71 Finally, the bonus score rewarded physicians for connecting 
64 Medicare Program; Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment 
Model (APM) Incentive under the Physician Fee Schedule, and Criteria for Physician Focused 
Payment Models, 81 Fed. Reg. 28, 162, 28,220 (May 9, 2016). 
65 Id at 28,221. 
66 Id. at 28,268. 
67 Id 
68 In Meaningful Use andACI, exclusions state that a provider does not need to report on the 
measure because there are not enough relevant encounters for the measure to be relevant For 
example, under 2018's rule, providers who write fewer than 100 prescriptions are excluded from 
thee-prescribing measure and do not have to report on it Medicare Program; CY 2018 Updates 
to the Quality Payment Program; and Quality Payment Program: Extreme and Uncontrollable 
Circrunstance Policy for the Transition Year, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,568, 53,680 (Nov. 16, 2017). 
69 Even if a practice does take referrals or transitions of care, the health information exchange 
measurement can be problematic. Imagine a retinal practice. Retinal medical issues are immediate 
emergencies; if action is not taken within hours, the patient may become permanently blind. If most 
patients are having a problem, they generally go to their optometrist or general ophthalmologist 
before seeking alternative care. If the optometrist or ophthalmologist sees a retinal problem, they 
will frequently arrange for an illlll1ediate evaluation with a retinal specialist, even walking the 
patient across the street to the retinal specialist for immediate surgery. At no point is the referring 
physician slowing down to send an electronic sunnnary of care. The retinal specialist is not going to 
"query" or ask the referring physician's system for a sunnnary of care. Instead, the retinal specialist 
will likely ask the physician and patient about the patient's current medications and potential 
allergies before whisking the patient away to surgery. Even in the event of a specialist's request for 
a srumnary of care, it may take days for the s1lllllllary to be completed and delivered. The referring 
physician's direct address may also be wrong in the directory, which is generally maintained by a 
private technology vendor like Surescripts. It is not maintained in NPPES, where all other provider 
contact information and the NPis are kept, so there is no ruriversal source of truth. 
70 Id 
71 For example, if a provider gives 3/10 patients access to their electrmric health record, that 
provider receives 3 points under ACI. 
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to public health registries or reporting improvement activities through an EHR. 72 
In aggregate, this amounted to a great deal of complexity to achieve only 25% of a 
provider's score. 
The program's complexity, rapid implementation, and perceived threat to small practices 
provoked industry outcry. In response to the turmoil, the American Medical Association 
(AMA) released a 70-page comment letter about the proposed regulation. The letter 
specifically advocated for a transitional period of reduced thresholds, seeking "a much 
more progressive and welcoming environment."73 The American Academy of Family 
Physicians (AAFP) used stronger language, stating that "we see a strong and definite 
need and opportunity for CMS to step back and reconsider the approach to this proposed 
rule which we view as overly complex and burdensome[.]"74 Both organizations 
called for an interim rule to scale back many of the proposed rule's provisions. The 
American Hospital Association (AHA) also weighed in, "urg[ing] CMS to monitor 
ongoing feedback of the field to implement MACRA, and to be willing to consider 
additional flexibility in its timeline and other requirements such as quality measure data 
completeness."75 Specialist societies lent their voices as well. The American College 
of Cardiology (ACC) called for CMS to "streamline and simplify" the program,76 
while the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS) noted that "it will be 
burdensome, if not impossible for physicians to get ready for the first performance year 
of2017."77 
Physician organizations were not alone in their criticism of the proposed rule. Technology 
vendors who supported MACRA's reporting and data collection requirements were 
equally concerned. The EHRA requested that "CMS take every possible step to 
dramatically simplify provisions and requirements, and to revise and develop provider-
focused communications to reduce remaining perceived complexity."78 The EHRA 
further requested 18 months of additional development time to support quality 
measures.79 The Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS), 
representing a broader swathe of the health IT market, noted that the timeline was 
problematic because vendors supporting the program would need to change measure/ 
Id 
Letter from the AMA to Andrew Slavitt, 
Medicaid Services (June 27, 2016). 
Letter from the AAFP to Andrew Slavitt, 
Medicaid Services (June 24, 2016). 
75 Letter from the AHA to Andrew Slavitl, 
Medicaid Services (June 27, 2016). 
76 Letter from the ACC to Andrew Slavitt, 
Medicaid Services (June 27, 2016). 
77 Letter from the AAOS to Andrew Slavitt, 
Medicaid Services (June 24, 2016). 
78 Letter from the EHR/\ to Andrew Slavitt, 
Medicaid Services (June 27, 2016). 
79 Id. 
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dashboard logic and user interfaces. 80 tenuous response as it became apparent that the 
market was not prepared for the ambitious proposed rule. 
B. Walking Back from Full Implementation to the Transition Years 
In response to overwhelming criticism, CMS drastically walked back its implementation 
of MIPS, echoing the Meaningful Use and EHR Incentive Programs. Most notably, CMS 
removed most of the program's financial consequences for the 2017 performance period. 
CMS changed the performance threshold by setting it at 3 points out of 100 instead 
of basing the threshold on the legacy programs' prior scores. This change had several 
financial impacts. First, in order to avoid a penalty, providers had to report on fewer 
measures than in prior years. CMS provided four "Pick Your Pace," reporting options: 
1. Do nothing, and receive a 4% penalty; 
2. Report on at least one quality measure, the required Advancing Care 
Information measures, or one improvement activity for at least 90 days 
to avoid any penalty; 
3. Report on more than one quality measure, the required Advancing Care 
Information measures, or one improvement activity for at least 90 days 
and earn a small incentive; or 
4. Fully report for a full calendar year and earn an incentive. 81 
In addition, CMS significantly expanded the list of providers who would receive an 
exclusion from the program. Under the new structure, a physician would be excluded 
from MIPS if they collected less than $30,000 in Medicare revenue or saw fewer 
than 100 Medicare patients. 82 Because CMS lowered the performance threshold 
and expanded exclusions, the total estimate of incentives and penalties for the 2017 
performance period was $199 million spread across at least 592,000 clinicians.83 The 
new structure reduced MIPS incentives and penalties to an average of only $336.15 per 
clinician program. 
The new and improved 2018 MAC RA rule continues the trend of expanding exclusions. 
The rule extends the transition period by another year while adding complexity and 
untested features to MIPS through the introduction of improvement scoring, virtual 
group reporting and new exclusions. The rule also raises the performance threshold to 
15 points out of 100. 84 To avoid a penalty, providers can take several pathways, including 
but not limited to: 
80 Letter from HIMSS to Andrew Slavitt, 
Medicaid Services (June 27, 2016). 
Administrator For the Centers for Medicare & 
81 Medicare Program; Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment 
Model (APM) Incentive under the Fee Schedule, and Criteria for Focused 
Payment Models, 81 Fed. Reg. 77,008, 77,011 (Nov. 4, 2016). 
82 Id. at 77,012. 
83 at 77,016. 
84 Medicare Program; CY 2018 to the Payment Program; and Payment 
Program: Extreme and Uncontrollable Circumstance for the Transition Year, 82 Fed. Reg. 
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1. Report on six clinical quality measures; 
2. Report on the required ACI measures and one quality measure; or, 
3. Fully participate in Clinical Practice Improvement Activities, which 
entails one to two process changes to receive full credit. 
Despite increasing the performance threshold, CMS further expanded the list of 
available exclusions to include providers seeing fewer than 200 patients or taking less 
than $90,000 in revenue. 85 Under the expanded exclusions, fewer clinicians will be 
penalized. With fewer providers paying penalties into the program, the total amount of 
incentive money available to participating providers will decrease to $118 million. 86 As 
a result, clinicians who were subject to the program in 2017 may be excluded in 2018. 
Moreover, when CMS proposed the 2018 rule, it introduced another element of 
complexity to the program by permitting virtual group reporting. This technically 
complex new reporting scheme allows organizations with 10 or fewer eligible clinicians 
to report as a single entity. 87 While it presumably enables smaller organizations to scale 
in the same manner as enterprise healthcare systems, different practices in a virtual 
group will likely use different EHRs. CMS did not release any guidance on how data 
would be submitted for virtual groups that use different EHRs. 
The rule also introduced "improvement scoring," where an organization could 
receive extra credit for improving Quality and Cost. However, CMS measures 
quality improvement at the category level. 88 This means that CMS would measure 
the improvement a provider made on the average of all measures selected, rather 
than the individual measures themselves. Given the high level of variance between 
quality measures, CMS even noted that this could leave improvement scoring open to 
gamesmanship. 89 
Finally, CMS also reintroduced exclusions for Advancing Care Information, and 
retroactively applied the exclusions to the 2017 performance period Gust 2 months 
before the closure of that performance period).90 Introducing new exclusions at this 
time-sensitive juncture left many developers with insufficient time to support providers, 
leaving the dashboards of some providers technically unsupported. This regulatory 
inconsistency and complexity between 201 7 and 2018 has set an uncertain stage for the 
future of MAC RA. 
53,568, 53,576 (Nov. 16, 2017). 
85 at 53,589. 
86 Id. 53,926. 
Id. 53,953 
88 Id. 53,740. 
89 Medicare Program; CY 2018 
Program: 
53,568, 53,740 (Nov. l 6, 2017). 
90 Id. 53,680. 
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V. WHAT'S NEXT AND MAXIMIZING PROGRAMMATIC EFFICACY 
AND EFFICIENCY 
Despite MACRA's challenging regulatory implementation, stabilizing programmatic 
implementation in the coming years will allow CMS to maximize the program's 
efficacy and gain buy-in from physicians. MIPS has already made several important 
improvements over its legacy programs, including a single reporting deadline and a 
reporting portal that displays a provider's live score before the submission period 
closes.91 CMS also recently announced two initiatives aimed at gaining provider support. 
First, the Meaningful Measures project seeks to reorient quality measures to provide 
less emphasis on process and have a greater focus on clinical outcomes.92 CMS has also 
launched Patients Over Paperwork, a program meant to implement President Trump's 
executive order to "cut the red tape." One of its primary and most laudable goals is to 
reduce the administrative time physicians spend on compliance with CMS programs, 
such as MIPS. In a recent newsletter, CMS stated that the new reporting portal and the 
removal of several quality measures are by-products of that initiative.93 
Plus, MIPS' scoring is already an improved version of the scoring systems implemented 
in the legacy programs. One example of this improvement is the fundamental removal 
of thresholds from Meaningful Use under ACI. Before, Meaningful Use was a pass/fail 
program with different thresholds for different measures.94 Today's program is more 
comparable to a performance category. Additionally, the removal of a cross-cutting 
quality measure will help specialists more effectively participate, specifically in the 
Quality category ofMIPS.95 
However, more work remains if CMS wants to regain physicians' confidence that 
MACRA will be more than just a reporting program where they must memorize a myriad 
ofrequirements. Two changes are integral to the program's future: reducing complexity 
and lengthening the regulatory cycle to the extent permitted by law. Acting with input 
from the AMA and other provider organizations, Congress has already provided CMS 
with the vehicle to accomplish these changes96 by pushing mean and median scoring 
91 Id at 53,626. 
92 Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS Administrator Verma Announces New 
LAN Summit (Oct. 30, 2017), 
releases/2017-Press-releases-items/2017-10-30 .html. 
94 See id at 5. 
95 Medicare Program; CY 2018 to the Quality Payment Program; and Payment 
Program: Extreme and Uncontrollable Circumstance for the Transition Year, 82 Fed. Reg. 
53,568, 53,628 (Nov. 16, 2017). 
96 The A.MA. and other "to continue the in the 
NlACRA statute that CMS is using for an additional three years so that the agency may 
move forward as the necessary program elements are put in " Letter from the AMA, et al, to 
Greg Walden, Chairman of the Cmrunittee and Commerce, 2, 2017). 
16 
Health Law & Policy Brief• Volume 12, Issue 2 •Spring 2018 
from 2019 to 2022.97 To accommodate this scoring change and provide a more natural 
onramp, CMS must gradually increase the performance threshold for the next three 
years. CMS must release new cost measures by December 31, 2018, with the option 
to weigh Cost between 10% and 30% (before, it was set to scale to 30% in 2019). 98 In 
another effort to introduce more simplicity, Congress removed improvement scoring 
from the program until 2022. 99 
CMS should also take further action to simplify scoring. Under ACI today, providers 
can earn up to 100%, which then represents 25% of their MIPS composite score. CMS 
defines full participation in the Quality category as reporting on six quality measures 
with at least one outcomes measure, a data submission threshold of 60%. 100 The top 
Quality score is 60 points, and represents 50% of a provider's score. 101 Clinical Practice 
Improvement Activities contain high priority measures worth 20 points, medium priority 
measures worth 10 points, and a 40 point or 20 point maximum that, depending on 
practice size, represents 15% of the provider's total MIPS composite score. 102 This is a 
tremendously complex scoring scheme that all practices must contend with, regardless 
of their size or sophistication. Varying the maximum scores in each category and 
eliminating nuances such as performance scores and base scores would further simplify 
the program. 
CMS should also provide greater consistency and simplicity in terms to aid provider 
understanding. As noted earlier, ACI contains a reference to a base score, performance 
score, and a bonus score. 103 For a physician or practice administrator who will not read 
the entirety of the regulation, the difference between a bonus score and performance 
score is difficult to understand. CMS 's decision to change or replace commonly used 
terms also presents difficulties to participating providers. CMS adopted the term "eligible 
clinician," a change from MACRA's statutory use of "eligible provider." Morphing the 
term Meaningful Use into ACI, while applying identical measure specifications, also 
caused needless confusion. CMS should avoid unnecessary changes in terminology 
and consider changing ACI to "MIPS Meaningful Use." This term more accurately 
describes the category, aligns the category with the terminology in the MACRA statute 
and allows providers to better understand of the term due to their previous experience 
with Meaningful Use. 
Finally, the broader market would benefit tremendously from extending the regulatory 
cycle and stabilizing implementation. Allowing some providers to claim an exclusion 
after participating in 2017 will cause providers to overlook the program based on a 
belief that it lacks tenacity. Then, if exempt providers become subject to MAC RA once 
97 of 2018, H.R 1892, 115th Cong. § 51003 (2018) 
98 
99 Id. 
100 Medicare Program; CY to the Payment Program; and Payment 
Program: and Uncontrollable Circumstance for the Transition Year, 82 Fed. Reg. 
53,568, 53,717 (Nov. 2017). 
101 Id. a1 53,717. 
102 Id. at 53,767. 
103 Id. 53,663. 
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again, they will be disillusioned and ultimately disinclined to participate. CMS should 
not implement further raises to the exclusionary thresholds. If CMS chooses to lower 
the thresholds, the agency should engage in significant education efforts so providers 
are not "blindsided" by the new exclusion guidelines. Moreover, CMS should start 
proposing new measures and exclusions eighteen months before implementation (rather 
than six). This extended implementation period would give providers enough time to 
familiarize themselves with new concepts. It would also provide technology vendors 
with additional time to support provider participation in MACRA through development 
of functionality tools such as updated dashboards and optimized EHR workflows. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
MACRA is a rare bipartisan achievement that streamlines prior programs while 
attempting to create a business case for changing the way the federal government pays 
providers. However, the program's success ultimately depends on its implementation. If 
CMS can administer the program in a way that allows physicians to buy in, it stands a 
much greater chance of success. Prior programs suffered because of inconsistent, uneven, 
and complex measurement. MACRA's first two years have echoed those prior reform 
efforts. Avoiding the historical pitfalls ofMACRA's predecessors will allow the program 
to succeed. Important improvements that should be integrated into MACRA over the 
coming year include lengthening the regulatory cycle, simplifying the requirements, 
and consistent implementation. These improvements will ensure achievement of the 
legislation's original intent while also providing for the program's overall success. 
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